Competition and complementarities between …rms can occur simultaneously. To ‡exibly identify the nature of strategic interaction between GPs and specialist types in Belgium, we present a sequential equilibrium entry game of incomplete information. The results indicate that some specialists are strategic complements (gynecologists, TNE-specialists) and some are strategic substitutes in the entry decision of GPs (dermatologists, ophthalmologists, psychiatrists). With free choice of physician, this is indicative for patients'choice behavior: for the latter group of specialists, patients often wrongly self-refer. Although introducing mandatory referral schemes would correct this ine¢ ciency, it would generate sustainability problems for the current body of specialists.
Introduction
The education system delivers a variety of physicians to society. There is the general practitioner (GP), or family doctor, who is trained to have a very broad knowledge on all current medical problems and to understand the wider background of his patientele. On the other hand, there is a long list of …elds of expertise in which physicians can be specialist, such as dermatologic or pediatric care. Although their initial education is broad, these specialists are trained to be experts in a speci…c …eld and are thus capable to diagnose and treat more complex and specialized cases. Given this education structure, the intention of complementarity in their services is clear: GPs treat regular cases and more complex or specialized cases are handled by specialists.
The reality is however not that clear-cut. In Belgium, as in almost half of Western-European countries and under several insurance contracts in the United States, patients have a free choice to contact any physician they like, GP or specialist. This complicates things considerably: a specialist is now not just a welcomed help in treating di¢ cult cases, but also becomes a competitor for the GP (Newhouse 1990) .
1 It is therefore a priori not clear whether GP services and specialist services are to be considered as complementary or as an example of product di¤erentiation in the care market. Furthermore, it is likely that the nature of the interactions between the health professionals di¤ers according to the …eld of specialty.
This article aims to empirically test the nature of the interactions between Belgian GPs and specialists of di¤erent …elds of expertise. We investigate whether GPs bene…t or are harmed by the presence of specialists in the market. We argue that in case GPs bene…t from the presence of specialists, the services provided by these health professionals can be considered as complementary. When GPs are harmed by the presence of specialists, competition for patients seems to dominate the interaction between the health providers.
Due to data availability constraints, we suggest evaluating the strategic interaction in the entry decisions between specialists and GPs. More precisely, by examining the choice of GPs and specialists to be active in di¤erent geographic markets, we infer the impact of the market presence of di¤erent kinds of specialists on GP payo¤s. We model the entry decisions of physicians as a strategic entry game in the tradition of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a,b) and Mazzeo (2002) . Our research question is however di¤erent from the existing literature in the sense that it is a priori not clear how the strategic interaction e¤ects are characterized. 2 ;3 We argue 1 Newhouse (1990) : "In reality, however, there is a certain amount of competition among specialties; this is perhaps most apparent between a general (or family) practitioner, on the one hand, and a general internist (or general pediatrician) on the other hand, but almost all specialists perform some services or procedures that other specialists also perform." (p.211) 2 A working paper by Vitorino (2008) addresses a similar research question in the setting of agglomoration e¤ects in shopping centers. 3 The literature provides a wide range of applications of entry models of product di¤erention such as on the competition between airlines (Berry 1992, Ciliberto and Tamer 2004) , between motels (Mazzeo 2002) and between banks (Cohen and Mazzeo 2007) . There are also some examples that cover positive strategic interaction e¤ects, i.e. strategic complementarity (Sweeting 2007, Schaumans and Verboven 2008). that in the event of strategic interaction e¤ects being asymmetric in sign, complete information games in pure equilibrium su¤er from the non-existence of pure-strategy equilibria. To avoid the typical restrictions on the underlying payo¤s with respect to the e¤ects of other-type physicians, this article proposes the use of a sequential incomplete information game in the spirit of Einav (2009) . It is shown that under this set of assumptions, the entry model has the appropriate ‡exibility to identify the nature of the strategic interaction e¤ects, while allowing for su¢ cient heterogeneity and while remaining computationally tractable.
We apply the structural entry model to the Belgian physician markets, which are characterized by free choice of physician and a fee-for-service system.
The complementarity or substitutability of GP and specialist services is primarily driven by patients' choice behavior in their decision to contact a GP or a specialist. With free choice of health provider, patients may choose to visit the specialist although the GP, if given the chance, would prefer to handle this patient him-or herself. When patients exibit this 'wrongly self-referring'behavior, GPs loose income and are thus harmed by the presence of specialists. On the other hand, when patients with complicated health problems go to the GP, the possibility to refer these patients to a specialist is bene…cial to the GP. In sum, the extent to which GPs are a¤ected by the presence of a specialist crucially depends on the choice behavior of patients.
We argue that identifying the interaction between GPs and specialists can indicate the extent to which patients wrongly self-refer. 4 This can in turn be viewed as a measure of the e¢ ciency of the use of specialist care. Although specialists often welcome the additional business, patients who wrongly self-refer are medically not better o¤, whereas they pay a higher price for it (i.e. the health insurer or society pays).
Furthermore, the demand for specialist care is arti…cially higher, which results in training a higher than optimal number of specialists. Health care is thus ine¢ ciently used when patients wrongly self-refer.
Insights in the choice behavior of patients furthermore contain valuable input for the debate of introducing gatekeeping. 5 That is, implementation of mandatory referral schemes, where GPs decide on the access of patients to specialist care, would eliminate these ine¢ ciencies: wrong self-referrals are no longer possible.
However, other ine¢ ciencies can be generated in the form of additional transaction costs: when patients are correctly self-referring to specialists, this policy change would generate additional and unnecessary GP contacts, whereas the number of contacts with specialists does not reduce. Furthermore, by altering the organization of the health care markets, the regulator would a¤ect the market opportunities of specialists. 4 Alternative ways to quantifying the extent to which patients wrongly self-refer to specialists is hard. Constructing a direct measure would require detailed patient-level and/or specialist-level data, with an objective measure of the necessity of secondary care. This data is not available. 5 Gatekeeping is present in a health care system if the following three criteria are ful…lled: Enrolment of patients with a speci…ed GP for a …xed period of time; payment for GPs is mainly by capitation per enrolled patient; and specialist care is usually only granted following referral by a GP (De Maeseneer et al 1999) . This paper focuses on the mandatory referral scheme (element 3) in the discussion on gatekeeping.
That is, when patients are wrongly self-referring, mandatory referral schemes lead the decrease in the patientele of specialists (i.e. e¢ ciency gain). If this drop is important, this can lead to a decrease in the number of specialists that is sustained in the market. 6 Given that these specialists are high-skilled workers and trained using public funding (and that still specialists are being trained), the drop in their sustainability can generate high welfare losses.
Based on the …ndings of the nature of the strategic interaction between GPs and specialists, we discuss the implications of introducing mandatory referral schemes in the Belgian health care market. 7 There is a large literature that evaluates the e¢ ciency gains and the quality or budget e¤ects of the presence of a gatekeeper in health care systems (Kulu-Glasgow et al 1998 , Delnoij et al 2000 , Gerdtham and Jönsson 2000 , Ferris et al 2001 , Brekke et al 2007 , Barros 1998 . Instead of descriptive ex-post analysis of the e¤ects of gatekeeping, we investigate a non-gatekeeping situation to get an insight in the e¢ ciency of the current use of medical professionals and on potential transition costs associated to introducing mandatory referral schemes. Note though that we do not perform a full welfare analysis of the implementation of gatekeeping nor do we take a stance of the importance of other arguments in favor or against gatekeeping.
Our estimation results for the Belgian physician markets indicate that the e¤ect of specialists on GP payo¤s depends on the specialization …eld. The entry decisions of gynecologists and ear, nose and throatspecialists (ENT) are estimated to be strategic complements to the entry decision of GPs. The presence of dermatologists, ophthalmologists and psychiatrists on the other hand is found to have a negative impact on GP payo¤s. These specialist types thus attract a lot of patients for whom GP care would su¢ ce. Finally, our results are not conclusive for pediatric and physiologic care. We conclude that the main ine¢ ciencies in the current health care system originate from the unnecessary use of dermatologic, ophthalmologic and psychiatric care.
With respect to the impact of introducing mandatory referral schemes in the Belgian care system, our …ndings indicate that e¢ ciency gains can be realized on the activities of subset of specialists, whereas mandatory referral schemes could introduce some ine¢ ciencies with respect to the use of other specialist care. At the same time, considerable transition costs are to be expected as the drop in the demand for specialist services translates in viability problems for the current body of dermatologists, ophthalmologists and psychiatrists. Simulation results indicate that a realistic drop in the demand for specialist services due to mandatory referrals would imply that up to 25% of the current specialists would be forced to exit the market.
The article is organized as follows. We start by discussing in more detail the relation between general practitioners and specialists in a market in which patients have free choice of medical provider and relate this to the identi…cation strategy. In Section 3, we introduce the application and thus the characteristics of the organization of health care markets in Belgium. Section 4 then presents the entry model to determine the strategic interaction e¤ects and discusses the particular strengths of the model given the research question.
Section 5 follows with the data description and the empirical implementation of the equilibrium model to the Belgian physician markets. The results of the analysis are presented and discussed in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes.
The interaction between specialists and GPs
When a patient visits a physician, the physician incurs some costs and receives some bene…ts. The bene…ts are the fee the physician gets for his/her work, but can also include the satisfaction of treating patients or the intellectual challenge of solving a di¢ cult case. The costs are associated to the material and the time used for talking to the patient, diagnosing the problem and possibly treatment. As in the absence of mandatory referral schemes (e.g. Belgium) patients can either go to a GP or directly to a specialist, we distinguish between four cases:
1. A patient with a regular health concern visits a GP.
It is worthwhile for the GP to treat the patient when the anticipated bene…ts of diagnosing and treatment outweigh the costs. We assume that the fee for GPs is set in such a way that this condition is satis…ed for the average health problem. When this is not the case, we assume that the ethical and intellectual satisfaction are su¢ ciently large for GPs to have positive payo¤s of treating patients with regular health concerns.
2. A patient in need of specialist care visits a GP.
It is worthwhile for the GP to refer patients to specialists when the anticipated costs of diagnosing and treatment outweigh the bene…ts. The education system designs and supports this complementary between GPs and specialists. That is, specialists are trained in specialized …elds and thus have lower marginal costs of treating patients with health issues related to their specialties. As these cases are generally more complicated, the specialists are also remunerated for the higher costs they incur. For patients that need specialist care, we assume that the GP visit has zero net payo¤s for the GP. That is, we assume that the costs of taking the …rst diagnostic measures are exactly covered by its bene…ts. 8 8 Remark that this implies that for these patients, GPs are indi¤erent between patients contacting them …rst and being 3. A patient with a regular health concern visits a specialist.
In this scenario the patient will be worse o¤. That is, in the event that he gets the same treatment, he will have to pay more for it compared to contacting a GP. Furthermore, there also exists the risk that the patient is not diagnosed or misdiagnosed, when the patients chooses the wrong specialist type.
Also the GP is worse o¤ because if given the chance, the GP would have opted to treat the patient.
That is, the GP's costs of managing this patient are lower than the associated bene…ts. We will refer to this case as a wrong self-referral, as the GP would not refer in this case.
4. A patient in need of specialist care visits a specialist.
By going to the (correct) specialist directly, the patient avoids paying for a GP visit in which he will be referred anyway. As the GP would decide to refer, we label this case as a correct self-referral. The patient will thus be better o¤ because of the reduced transaction costs, whereas the GP is indi¤erent as the costs and bene…ts of this visit would perfectly outweigh each other (by assumption). The specialist is now the …rst contact of the patient with his health concern. In such, all initial tests and diagnostic e¤orts will have to be carried by the specialist. The specialist thus prefers these patients to be referred by a GP.
Given this set-up, consider the impact of the presence of a specialist on the payo¤ of a GP. The presence of a specialist implies that the GP is able to refer patients: he/she will refer those patients for who the expected costs for treatment outweigh the expected bene…ts. In such, the average marginal cost of treatment for the GP reduces. As a 'referral visit'yields GPs no net bene…ts, payo¤s are higher when specialists are present in the market. We label this positive impact on GP payo¤s of the presence of specialists as the referral e¤ ect.
On the other hand though, to some extent GPs and specialists deliver the same services and specialists are thus competing for patients with GPs. That is, patients now have the option to go to the specialist instead of to the GP. To the extent that patients correctly self-refer, this does not harm the GP. But when patients wrongly self-refer, the GP foregoes the opportunity to increase his payo¤s. This negative impact on GP payo¤s of the presence of specialists is labeled as the competition e¤ ect. 9 referred to a specialist and patients contacting the specialist directly. When GPs take their job seriously and don't just refer all patients to specialists to limit their workload, this is a realistic assumption. 9 Remark that the interpretation of the signs of the strategic interaction e¤ects in terms of the incidence of wrong referrals is driven by the assumption that GPs are not loosing income in case patients correctly self-refer. For Belgium, we believe this assumption is justi…ed as the workload of the average GP is rather high (there are often claims of a shortage of GPs). Therefore, they have a high opportunity cost of time.
The interaction between GPs and specialist
The positive referral e¤ect and negative competition e¤ect occur at the same time, so that it is a priori not clear whether a GP will bene…t or will be harmed by the presence of specialists in the market. It is ultimately an empirical question. The answer hinges on the extent to which patients correctly and wrongly self-refer to specialists. That is, when most of the patients wrongly self-refer to a specialist, the competition e¤ect is large so that the GP is likely to be harmed by the presence of the specialist. When most of the patients correctly self-refer to a specialist or when most of the patients continue to visit the GP …rst, positive referral e¤ects can result from the presence of the specialist.
By estimating the impact of the presence of specialists on GP payo¤s, we can therefore evaluate the incidence of wrong self-refer. That is, when the presence of a specialist negatively impacts the payo¤s of GPs, the competition e¤ect outweighs the referral e¤ect. This is the case when many patients wrongly selfrefer. When the presence of a specialist on the other hand positively impacts GP payo¤s, the competition e¤ect is dominated by the referral e¤ect. Therefore, not too many patients wrongly self-refer or the bene…ts from referring are large (the GP refers a lot or the value of referring is high).
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The impact of introducing mandatory referral schemes As gatekeeping is believed to contribute to e¢ ciency and cost containment, policy makers in countries without gatekeeping are increasingly interested in the adoption of a mandatory referral scheme: patients can access secondary care only following a referral from their GP. However, introducing mandatory referral schemes also changes the entire organization of the health care markets and forces patients to change their choice behavior with respect to contacting a GP or a specialist.
To the extent that patients wrongly self-refer, the obliged GP visit yields e¢ ciency gains: GPs treat patients with regular health problems instead of the more expensive specialist services being used. But when the majority of patients correctly self-refer to specialists, the new system would introduce additional transaction costs and ine¢ ciencies compared to the system of free choice. That is, it generates additional and unnecessary GP contacts, whereas the number of contacts with specialists does not reduce. Furthermore, although e¢ ciency gains might realize, important transition costs accompany the introduction of mandatory referral schemes. That is, when patients are wrongly self-referring, the increased e¢ ciency will go together with a decrease in the patientele of specialists. These changing market opportunities can lead to a decrease in the number of specialists that is sustained in the market and thus to welfare losses. 1 0 We want to remark that one could also try to interprete the impact of GPs on specialist payo¤s: when there is a GP, there might be less self-referrals, which could negatively impact specialists' payo¤s. We choose not to look at this e¤ect, because there are many GPs per market: how would we interpret the change in payo¤s due to an increase in the number of GPs from 15 to 16 GPs. Furthermore, many arguments with respect to positive or negative impacts of wrong self-referral on specialist payo¤s can be told.
Organization of the Belgian Health care Markets
Before looking at the entry model to estimate the nature of the strategic interaction between GPs and specialists, we introduce the characteristics and the organization of the primary and secondary health care provision in Belgium. We focus on the entry requirements, the conduct and the interaction between physician types as these determine the set-up of the model.
The delivery of health care in Belgium, a social health insurance country, is mainly private and based on the principles of independent medical practice. Belgium is known for having a high GP density: for 2005, we account for the presence of one GP per 859 inhabitants. Furthermore, for a total population of about ten million there are close to 40; 000 active physicians (GPs and specialists), which makes Belgium the second most physician dense country of Europe, after Greece (OECD Health Data). The high availability of medical care is also associated with a high consumption level of care services: Belgians on average have 4:6 contacts with a GP and 2:3 contacts with specialists per year (WIV 2006) .
Entry requirements
Entry into the medical professions is conditional on minimum educational standards (licensing). Medical students start with a six-year program, which covers the basics for all physician types, followed by a oneyear introduction to the preferred specialization …eld, which mostly consists of internships. After this initial period of seven years, medical students start their study of a specialty to obtain a license to practice: such …elds of specialization include e.g. general medicine, gynecology and dermatology. These further studies consist of two years of internships and seminars for GPs and on average 5 years of study and internships for the di¤erent specialist types. Note that there is a restriction on the number of students that can start in each specialization …eld and that retraining to another specialization …eld is very rare: also retraining from a specialist type to a GP requires additional study. Apart from these educational requirements and some administration, entry in the Belgian physician markets is free. That is, a licensed and registered physician of any type can choose to locate an o¢ ce anywhere in Belgium.
11 Note that the industry and governmental institutions also provide employment opportunities for licensed physicians of di¤erent types, which gives potential physicians the option to not entering the physician market. A recent study by KCE indicates that 20% of the licensed GPs never practice the profession and that there is an exit rate amongst starters of 15% over a 10-year period (KCE 2008) .
Conduct
1 1 This is in contrast to the regulation in some neighboring countries. In The Netherlands and Germany, there is regulation on the number of physicians per local market. Belgium has similar regulation for the pharmacy market. Adjustments to the entry model for these entry restrictions are demonstrated in Schaumans and Verboven (2008 In general, both GPs and specialists (in hospitals and in private practice) are remunerated through feefor-service payment where fees are set at the national level by the Convention Committee of the health insurers and physicians 13 . As a result, a drop in workload directly translates into a decrease of income.
The fee-for-service system furthermore prevents price competition amongst physicians of the same type. A consultation with a specialist is however substantially more expensive than a GP contact: in January 2005, patients' copayment for a consultation was 3:29e with a GP, whereas the patient pays on average more than 10e for a specialist contact. Although there is no price competition and furthermore self-regulation traditionally prevented physicians to compete through advertising, physicians do have a wide range of other instruments they can use to compete with: quality of treatment, time spend on a consultation, availability, home visits (for GPs), waiting time and so on.
Interaction between health providers
The Belgian health care system does not include any gatekeeping role for GPs. Neither referral nor enrolment system is in place. There is thus free choice of physician and because the functions and roles of most health care personnel have not been clearly de…ned, specialists often form the …rst point of contact. WIV (2006) reports that on average 55% of all new contacts with specialists are initiated by the patient rather than by a GP. There are signi…cant di¤erences however according to gender and age in the self-referring behavior.
For example, females and young adults tend to self-refer more often.
Containment of health expenditure has been on the political agenda since the eighties and in 1993, some initiatives were launched to serve this purpose: amongst others there was a signi…cant increase of copayment.
But with the challenges of ageing and the development of expensive new medical techniques, initiatives on 1 2 75% of the population indicates visiting a GP that operates solo (WIV 2006) . The percentage of GPs working solo is expected to be a bit higher than this. The number of centers operating as a multidisciplinary team (integrated health care practices) is growing, but there is still only a small minority of people a¢ liated to them. Our dataset does not allow us to identify them.
1 3 In principle, only health professionals associated to university hospitals do not work (solely) on a fee-for-service basis, but are salaried. We will exclude the markets with university hospitals from the analysis below. cost containment and e¢ ciency remain important. In 1999, the Belgian authorities started with …nancial incentives for patients to participate in a system of enrolment with a preferred GP. Over the …rst …ve years, more than 30% of the population already enrolled. Moreover, in 2004, 95% of the population indicates having a regular GP (WIV 2006 ) and a 2001-survey of one of the Belgian health insurers indicates that 75% of the patientele of a GP is loyal.
14 This indicates that the majority of patients seem not to be shopping around as far as GP care is concerned. Secondly, as of February 1st, 2007 a specialist contact that is not initiated by a GP referral has become more expensive for the patient, although the price di¤erence of 5e is only valid for one contact per year. 15 When these cost containment measures would have full impact, they would mimic the situation under a mandatory referral scheme: patients register with a preferred GP and due to …nancial incentives, they visit the GP …rst. It should be noted though that the …nancial incentives, as they are today, are not (very) e¤ective, in the sense that they are too small to signi…cantly alter the choice behavior of patients. Nonetheless, the Belgium regulator has put into place the …rst steps towards a gatekeeping system.
Entry Model
In this section, we present a static entry model to ‡exibly estimate the strategic interaction e¤ects between specialist types and GPs to evaluate whether GPs especially bene…t (referral e¤ect) or are especially harmed (competition e¤ect) by the presence of specialists. Our method thus focuses on identifying the signs of the strategic interaction e¤ects of di¤erent specialist types on GP payo¤s entering the market.
The characteristics of the Belgian health care markets, as described in section 3, motivate the basic properties of our entry model. First, because of the educational requirements in the physician markets, each physician knows its specialty (i.e. GP, dermatologist, etc.) before the entry game starts. Entrants therefore make no specialty choice. Furthermore, although licensing limits the total number of potential physician entrants, the lack of restrictions on the number of entrants in a local market implies that the pool of entrants for a speci…c local market is large. 16 Finally, because the majority of GPs still operate in a solo-practice and also specialists work for their own account, we can treat all entry decisions as individual decisions.
We propose to model the entry decisions of physicians as a sequential game of incomplete information.
To be more precise, we assume that physicians that are trained in the same specialty are homogenous and have complete information about each others'payo¤s. However, physicians have incomplete information on the payo¤s of physicians that are trained in another specialty. It is thus assumed that physicians receive some additional information about their payo¤s in a market while they are trained in their specialty …eld. As the private information in this model thus stems from the di¤erent medical specialties, we refer to physician types. It is furthermore assumed that types make their entry decisions in a pre-speci…ed order.
We start this section by introducing the model set-up, …rm behavior and the equilibrium of the game.
This is followed by a discussion on the choice of the modeling assumptions.
Set-up and payo¤s
Let the set of players in market m be grouped in T types of physicians, with F t potential physicians of type
The action space of all players of all types consists of entering or not entering the market.
Physicians know their type before the entry decision is made and physicians of the same type are assumed homogenous: we denote GPs as physicians of type 1 and the di¤erent specialist types are assigned type 2 to type T . 17 With payo¤s of not entering the market normalized to zero, we represent payo¤s of a physician of type t entering market m by the following reduced form:
The observed component of physician payo¤s ( ) depends on market characteristics (X m , such as the number of inhabitants) and the entry decisions of all physicians. Type-speci…c coe¢ cients allow for payo¤s to vary across types. Furthermore, payo¤s vary across physician types because of type-speci…c characteristics. These type-speci…c characteristics are assumed to be unobserved by both the researcher and other physician types 
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To be perfectly clear, remark that payo¤s is type-speci…c but not …rm-speci…c: our model is one of incomplete information not because of …rm-level heterogeneity, but due to type-speci…c market unobservables.
Put di¤erently, we present a model with complete information within type (market level error term), but with incomplete information between types.
Consistent with the existing literature, same-type physicians are strategic substitutes. That is, payo¤s are assumed to be decreasing in the number of physicians of the own type: t < 0. Furthermore, to reduce the computational burden of the model, we make the following simplifying assumption with respect to the e¤ect on payo¤s of the number of entrants of other types:
That is, it is assumed that payo¤s of all specialist types -all physician types but the GPs (t 6 = 1) -are a¤ected only by the number of own-type rivals and by the number of GPs in the market. In other words, entry decisions of specialists of di¤erent types are independent from each other, at least in …rst order: there remain some indirect e¤ects between specialist types through their simultaneous e¤ect on the GP market.
Given the characteristics of the application, this assumption is not strong: for the types we will focus on, specialists rarely refer patients directly to other specialist types. 19 Importantly, GP payo¤s (type 1) are a¤ected by the number of physicians of all types.
In contrast to the traditional empirical entry literature, we make no assumptions on the signs of the strategic interaction e¤ects. Instead, estimation of the model will yield insights on this. A negative e¤ect ( tj < 0) indicates that the entry decisions of type-j physicians are strategic substitutes to the entry decision of physicians of type t: the entry of a type-j physician in the market yields an additional competitive e¤ect. A positive e¤ect ( tj > 0) on the contrary implies strategic complementarity in the entry decisions for physicians of type t as payo¤s of entering a market increase in the number of other-type physicians. Furthermore, the strategic interaction e¤ects between any two types of physicians are allowed to be asymmetric, both in magnitude ( 12 6 = 21 ) and in sign (i.e. 12 < 0 and 21 > 0). The latter is a particular strength of the incomplete information game and important to allow for in our application. That is, whereas specialists are probably positively a¤ected by the entry decision of GPs, the competitive e¤ect can dominate the strategic e¤ect of a specialist type on GP payo¤s.
With physicians' payo¤s of entering market m at hand, we model their entry decisions as a strategic three-stage game.
Stage 1: all potential entrants of type 1 simultaneously make their entry decisions.
Stage 2: type-2 to type-T players simultaneously decide on entry.
Stage 3: all physicians that have entered market m interact and payo¤s are realized ( m t ).
Two remarks are in place. First, the assumption that GPs make their entry choice …rst is motivated by the consideration that a GP's patientele is mainly trust-based and very local whereas this is rather reputationbased in the specialists'markets. As such, GPs'sunk costs of entering a speci…c local market is higher. This implies that GPs are more strongly committed to ex-post follow through their entry decision. 20 Second, because of the assumption on the strategic independence of specialist types, the simultaneous entry stage for all specialist types (stage 2) yields the exact same market equilibrium as a game in which the di¤erent types would enter sequentially in a pre-speci…ed order (see Einav 2009 21 ).
Firm behavior and Equilibrium
Physicians decide on entering the market according to a pre-speci…ed order of play: GPs (type 1) move …rst whereas the specialist types simultaneously decide in the second stage of the game. As a result, the model can be solved backwardly for its perfect Bayesian equilibrium (Einav 2009). As physicians of the same type are assumed homogenous, we solve for the equilibrium number of entrants per type in the market. As physicians enter when they deem it to be pro…table, the long run perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium market structure in market m consists of the maximum number of physicians that is viable, given their product di¤erentiation.
We start by looking at the entry decisions in the second stage of the game, where the specialist types decide on entry. Importantly, although the information on the GP-speci…c error term is unknown to all potential specialist entrants, they do observe the total number of GP entrants per market as a result of the realization of the GP-speci…c error term. This is because GPs decide on entry …rst (sequentiality assumption).
Therefore, all payo¤-relevant information in the second stage of the game is disclosed when specialist types decide on entry.
We continue by discussing the entry decision by GPs in the …rst stage of the game. Potential entrants of type 1 observe all market characteristics and the private realization of the GP-speci…c unobservable. As the realization of the unobservables of other physician types is not known, GPs conjecture on the actions of all other physician types. Physicians of type 1 thus decide whether or not to enter the local market m based on their expected payo¤s of entering.
Together, the equilibrium entry strategy of all physician types results in the perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium market structure for market m
Second stage
In the second stage of the game, type-1 physicians have already made their entry decisions. Now, the F t potential entrants of the specialist types (t 2 [2; T ]) simultaneously decide on entry in market m. They use all available information and thus condition their choice behavior on the observed number of type-1 entrants (N 1 = n m 1 ). Furthermore, the entry decisions are independent across types by assumption. With the realization of the type-speci…c error term being common knowledge within type, all determinants of type-t physician payo¤s are observed. Physicians of type 2 to type T thus base their entry decisions on the following conditional payo¤s of entering market m:
Each individual type-t physician enters the market when the observed payo¤ shock allows pro…table entry,
given the observed number of GP entrants in the market. As the type-speci…c payo¤ shock is common knowledge, all potential entrants can perfectly anticipate on the number of entrants of the own type, i.e.
the maximum number for which all entrants are expected to be pro…table. Following Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), for any realization of the number of type-1 physicians (N 1 = n m 1 ), the probability that in the Nash equilibrium, n t physicians of type t (t 2 [2; T ]) enter market m is given by:
First stage
Potential entrants of type 1 make their entry decisions …rst and decide based on their expected payo¤s of entering market m. In contrast to the second movers, type-1 physicians conjecture on the choice behavior of the physicians of all other types. As physicians of type 1 are homogenous and have the same information, their conjectures on the actions of the physicians of the other types are the same in equilibrium. The expected payo¤s of entering market m can be written as
As GPs have some information on the payo¤s of physicians of other types, the potential entrants of type 1 can anticipate on the choice behavior of type-t physicians. Based on the equilibrium behavior of specialist types and the distribution of the type-speci…c unobservables (G), GPs deduce the probability of observing a speci…c number of entrants of a specialist type. This is given by equation (3), where it is important to note that the expected number of type-2 to type-T entrants depends on the realization of the number of entrants of type 1. The expectation of physicians of type 1 over the number of physicians of type 2 to type T in market m can thus be updated by integrating out over the probability of observing n m t specialists of type t entering the market, conditional on the number of type-1 physicians:
As a result, expected payo¤s can be written to only depend on the realization of the number of entrants of the own type. Note that although the market level payo¤ shock in the GP market is common knowledge for all GPs, the potential entrants are not capable to perfectly predict the number of GPs that can be pro…table in the market due to the interaction e¤ects with the predicted state of the specialist markets. They decide on entry based on expected payo¤s. The probability that a market structure with n m 1 physicians of type 1 is a Nash equilibrium, is given by the probability of type-1 physicians being pro…table in the presence of n m 1 rivals, but unpro…table with an additional entrant in the market:
Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
For the presented entry game with incomplete information between physician types and a pre-speci…ed orders of moves, the equilibrium probability of observing market structure (n 1 ; n 2 ; :::; n T ) in market m is described by: 
Discussion
The empirical model to tackle our research question is closest related to the incomplete information game in Einav (2009). In a study to explain the observed demand patterns in the movie industry, Einav presents a sequential game of incomplete information to explain the timing decision of movie distributors: In our setting …rms make decisions to enter geographic markets, i.e. the unit of observation is a local market as opposed to a point in time. But more importantly, the setting of Einav concerns few potential entrants with observable heterogeneity, for which he considers the timing decision separately. We instead group …rms into homogenous types and look at the aggregate decision of each physician type. We thus study the equilibrium number of entrants per type, which increases the dimensionality of the model.
Our modeling assumptions are used explicitly to meet the requirements of the research question at hand.
First, we intend to identify the sign of the strategic interaction e¤ects between di¤erent physician types.
Second, we cannot exclude the possibility that the strategic interaction e¤ects between GPs and a specialist type are asymmetric in sign. 22 And third, as there exist a lot of physician types -GPs, dermatologists, pediatricians, gynecologists, psychiatrists, and so on -we want to allow for su¢ cient type heterogeneity.
The model presented is one of incomplete information due to the required ‡exibility of the strategic interaction e¤ects. Although recent estimation techniques for games of complete information, such as the bounds approach (e.g. Ciliberto and Tamer 2004) or the method of inequality conditions (e.g. Andrews et al 2004), allow for some more ‡exibility, they still require that the strategic interaction e¤ects are symmetric in sign due to the completeness of the information set. We demonstrate this point in panel A of Figure I , where we display a complete information game between two …rms (for expositional reasons) where the strategic interaction e¤ects are asymmetric in sign. That is, the presence of …rm 2 positively a¤ects payo¤s of …rm 1, whereas the presence of …rm 1 negatively impact payo¤s of …rm 2. It is clear that for medium-valued realizations of the error terms, no pure-strategy equilibrium strategy can be found. As a result, there exists no well-de…ned likelihood function for the probability of observing the di¤erent market outcomes. Even though advanced techniques might allow a researcher to estimate the model, the results cannot be trusted as the underlying mapping of unobservables to market structures is non-existing. As such, complete information games require the knowledge of or an assumption on the nature of the strategic interaction e¤ects (strategic complements or strategic substitutes) to de…ne the likelihood function.
<Insert Figure 1 here>
Modeling and estimating …rm conduct while allowing for more ‡exible strategic interactions between …rm types requires the researcher to abandon either the pure-strategy equilibrium assumption (Bajari et al 2007 , Aradillas-Lopez 2007 or the assumption of complete information. In this article, we adjust the assumption on the characteristics of the information set and work under the incomplete information assumption. In incomplete information games …rms decide based on expected payo¤s so that the decision to enter does not depend directly on the realization of the error terms of the other type …rms. This is demonstrated in panel B of Figure I for our model of incomplete information and pre-speci…ed order of moves. 23 Furthermore, the incompleteness of the information structure implies that the empirical model is invariant to the nature of the strategic interaction e¤ects. 24 Therefore, we can use simple estimation techniques without further assumptions on the underlying payo¤s. Although the recent literature increasingly uses the assumption of an incomplete information set, its potential to deal with ‡exible interactions has not been fully recognized.
The choice for incomplete information games is often made based on considerations of computational burden. Recent developments in the literature however allow for estimating a higher degree of …rm heterogeneity in complete information games, but identi…cation is here reduced to the set of models for which the data is consistent (Ciliberto and Tamer 2004 25 ). Instead, an incomplete information setting retains point 2 3 Note that you can easily show the same with a game of incomplete information and simultaneous choices. 2 4 This refers to the fact that the use of standard maximum likelihood based on well-de…ned areas of integration is not possible for games of complete information without determining the sign of the strategic interaction e¤ects (the mapping di¤ers according to the assumption, see Schaumans and Verboven, 2008) 2 5 The methodology proposed in Ciliberto and Tamer (2004) also allow for a ‡exible estimation of the underlying payo¤s while dealing with the issue of multiple equilibria. This method implies that the data itself will be used to determine how the areas of error term realizations connected to a certain market structure are de…ned. Computational burden however increases fast when the binary model is extended to estimating the number of …rms of a type entering the market. Furthermore, although type identi…cation while being less computationally intensive. A drawback of the incomplete information model however remains the presence of ex-post regret. Note though that the sequentiality assumption and the fact that the error terms are type-and not …rm-speci…c imply that only the …rst mover is subject to ex-post regret (Einav 2009). In other words, only the GPs can regret having entered or not entered the market.
Contrary to most of the incomplete information games that assume the same equilibrium is played in all markets, we solve the multiplicity problem in the game by assuming that types enter the market in a pre-de…ned order and thus solve the game for the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium (Einav 2009). This assumption helps us to reduce the computational burden of allowing for a high degree of …rm heterogeneity in the model.
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The computational complexity of our model is also considerably reduced by assuming that private information is type-speci…c instead of …rm-speci…c: in the latter case, …rms would be heterogeneous and the equilibrium market structure would be driven by expectations on the choice behavior of …rms of the same type, which requires solving for a …xed-point equilibrium entry probability in all the substages of the game 
Empirical Implementation
To implement the empirical entry model to explain the characteristics of the Belgian physician markets, it remains to specify the reduced form payo¤ functions for the physician types and to make an assumption on the distribution of market and type-speci…c unobservables. In this section, we discuss further implementation and identi…cation issues, after which the data on the Belgian health care markets is introduced. speci…c variables and exclusion restrictions are not per se needed, they help reduce the bounds of the parameter set. Finally, an extension of the model is needed to allow for mixed equilibria when the strategic interaction e¤ects do not have the same sign. Apart from these technical drawbacks in the empirical implementation, this methodology however does allow for a ‡exible estimation of the strategic interactions and correlation in the unobservables.
2 6 Einav (2009) argues that the equilibrium calculus is linear in the number of players in the market, and thus has the bene…t over simultaneous incomplete information games, which rely on numerical search algorithms.
2 7 Computational burden is further increased as in our model, the equilibrium probabilities would be unique, but might be unstable. Searching for the equilibrium expectations under instability of the probability mapping is very time consuming. Using the Nested Pseudo-likelihood method presented by Aguirregabirria and Mira (2002) could be a feasible alternative.
2 8 A recent working paper by Vitorino (2008) addresses a related issue using a simultaneous game of incomplete information. She studies the presence of agglomeration e¤ects of shopping centers and also uses the property of the incomplete information game of allowing for the e¤ect of same type stores to be either positive (agglomeration dominates) or negative (competition dominates). The setting is quite di¤erent though. She considers a limited number of potential entrants (3) with …rm-speci…c characteristics of a limited number of potential types (3) to choose to enter a shopping mall. Instead of assuming sequential entry, it is assumed that the same equilibrium is picked in similar markets. As a result, her estimation approach is more complex to solve for the equilibrium, but it is managable because the number of potential entrants is limited.
Model implementation and Identi…cation
To estimate the entry model, we use the payo¤ speci…cation as introduced in equation (1). We allow for asymmetries, both in magnitude and in sign, in the strategic interaction e¤ects by estimating type-speci…c coe¢ cients. Standard t-tests su¢ ce to infer the nature of strategic interactions between Belgian physicians of di¤erent types. Note that the numbers of physicians of all types enter linearly. We thus assume that an extra entrant always has the same impact on payo¤s, irrespective of the number of entrants that is already present in the market. This choice is solely based on computational issues and is consistent with the literature. 29 We treat the model's unobservables (" m t ) as realizations of a standard logistic distribution. 30 With this assumption the model is completed so that we can take the likelihoodfunction as given in equation (7) to the data. For computation, it should be noted though that GPs decide based on expected payo¤s: calculating these expected payo¤s implies computing the probability of observing any number of specialists of any type conditional on any possible number of GP entrants. 31 For estimation, we reduce the dimensionality of the problem by limiting the number of GPs and specialists to a maximum of 30 (F t = 30). With 88:5% of our markets containing less than 30 GPs and virtually all municipalities having less than 30 specialists of a speci…c type, this assumption is not restrictive.
Estimation of the model identi…es the coe¢ cients related to the market characteristics ( t ) and the coe¢ cients related to the number of physicians of the own and the other types ( t ; tj ). All these coe¢ cients are identi…ed up to the scale of the error term. Furthermore, the e¤ects of the other-type physicians are not separately identi…ed from possible correlation in the unobservables, because the realization of the error terms are assumed independent across types. Consequently, the …nding of a positive (negative) interaction e¤ect can be due to real complementarities (substitutability) in the entry decisions of the professionals, but can also originate from a positive (negative) correlation in the market unobservables. We share this property with other models of incomplete information (Seim 2006 , Einav 2009 , Dutta et al 2007 .
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Furthermore, our data consists of neither panel data nor good instruments for the presence of the di¤erent specialist types in GP payo¤s to solve for the separate identi…cation of the correlation and the strategic interaction e¤ects. As we are primarily interested in the e¤ect of di¤erent specialist types on the entry decision 2 9 Theoretically one can estimate a more realistic pattern of e¤ects, with e.g. …xed e¤ects for all market structures. However, our dataset restricts the extent to which we can identify such parameters: we have few markets with few GP entrants and many markets with no specialist entrants. Note that our assumption furthermore contains the number of parameters to estimate.
3 0 We can also estimate the model under the assumption that the unobservables are distributed according to a standard normal. Our conclusions are robust against the distributional assumption.
3 1 The computational bene…t of assuming GPs to move …rst lays here. If the di¤erent specialist types were to decide …rst, each of them would anticipate on the choice behavior of the GPs, which condition on the entry decisions of all specialist types. As a result, one specialist type now has to take into account the choice behavior of all other specialist types.
3 2 Note that models of complete information in general do not alleviate this problem: whereas they do allow for correlation in strategic interaction e¤ects, separate identi…cation of the correlation coe¢ cient from these e¤ects is not straightforward and requires good instrumentation in the payo¤s of all types (Athey and Stern, 2003) .
of GPs, our instruments should a¤ect the presence of a speci…c specialist type while having no impact on the pro…tability of GPs. Two issues arise: …rst, we need at least as many instruments as we have specialist types. Second, none of the market characteristics presented above (nor other possible characteristics we considered) pass the second requirement. For example, the percentage toddlers is clearly very important for the pediatrician payo¤s, but this age category also provides extra demand for GPs, especially as pediatricians do not perform home visits and only work on the regular o¢ ce hours.
Although we can therefore not correct for the possible correlation in market unobservables (i.e. no exclusion restrictions), we are able to limit the related concerns: …rst, we correct for a lot of market characteristics, as to reduce the magnitude of the unobservables and second, we estimate the model while allowing for a high degree of …rm heterogeneity in the market, which reduces the possible bias on the individual interaction e¤ects in GP payo¤s. That is, the bias is reduced to only the correlation between the GP error term and the specialist type error term, conditional on the number of other specialist types. Nonetheless, there can remain an upward bias in the estimates of the strategic interaction e¤ects, which we will keep in mind in the interpretation of our results.
Finally, we would ideally want to estimate a speci…cation with a payo¤ function for all physician types separately. However, despite the assumptions to reduce the computational burden of the model, we are still confronted with optimization problems. We therefore use the classes of specialists to reduce the number of physician types in the empirical model (see section 5). With our primary interest in the e¤ect on GP payo¤s of specialists of classes 1 and 2, we estimate the model twice. First, we focus on the strategic interaction of the entry decisions of GPs and specialist types of class 1, while grouping the other specialist types by class. That is, we specify payo¤s for seven physician types: GPs, dermatologists, gynecologists, pediatricians, ophthalmologists, class-2 specialists and class-3 specialists. The second estimation does the same but then considers the specialist types of class 2. Payo¤s are de…ned for six types: GPs, psychiatrists, ENT-specialists, physiologists, class-1 specialists and class-3 specialists. Note that the entry behavior of class-3 specialists is always included as an endogenous control variable.
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Data on Belgian health care markets
In this section, we present the dataset for the study on Belgian GPs and specialists. The …rst step consists of de…ning the relevant geographic market. There is however little guidance on this: unlike in the US, antitrust o¢ ces have not (yet) addressed any cases of merging physician o¢ ces, because this phenomenon is marginal in Belgium and prices are …xed. We nonetheless know that physicians cannot engage in advertising or other promotional selling activities. Therefore, patient choice is largely guided by local information. Furthermore, 95% of the Belgian population indicates having a regular GP which is conveniently located close to their home. The town might thus be as far as the sphere of in ‡uence for a GP reaches. For specialists on the other hand, it is generally believed that patients are willing to travel further, making the relevant geographic market of specialists larger (Ettinger 1998) . In this article, we de…ne the municipality as relevant geographic market for all physician types. Belgium is made up of towns that are grouped into 586 municipalities, where the average municipality counts 17; 590 inhabitants. 34 Allowing for di¤erences in relevant market de…nition is subject of future research.
For the empirical implementation of the model, we do not include municipalities with more than 100; 000
inhabitants to reduce the heterogeneity in the number of practitioners. Furthermore, municipalities that have a university hospital are dropped to avoid potential problems with the market de…nition (their good reputation attract patients from all over the country) and potential problems due the di¤erent reimbursement scheme and objective function for practitioners within university hospitals. This selection reduces our sample to 564 municipalities. Note though that our results are robust against the inclusion of these markets.
Health providers
Privacy concerns limit the data availability on health care professionals to a location measure (= zip code).
For general practitioners, we rely on a dataset of the Belgian Institute for Sickness and Invalidity Insurance (RIZIV/INAMI). From this dataset, we select those GPs that are truly active and available to the public (outside of hospitals) based on their performance. As selection criterion we use a recent regulation (July 1st, 2006) which states that GPs will only remain certi…ed if they have more than 500 contacts in one of the last …ve years. From dialogue with RIZIV/INAMI, we add the restriction that GPs should have at least 50 patients in one of the last …ve years. 35 We used data on the number of contacts of all registered 
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For specialists, a dataset from Dendrite Belgium gives the number of active specialists in Belgian zip codes according to their self-reported …eld of specialization in April 2005. 37 We opt to work with every location where a specialist is active. That is, we are not able to distinguish between the locations in terms of the time a specialist spends at certain o¢ ces. However, even if the specialist is only active in a local market for a small time period, he/she will still be available to patients and can thus be considered to interact with other health care providers. 38 We furthermore aggregate specialties as to come to a manageable and more or less homogenous group of specialist types and de…ne three classes of specialists. First, there are those who are claiming a role in the …rst line care (WIV 2006) . In this class, we identify dermatologists (der ), gynecologists (gyn), pediatricians (ped ) and ophthalmologists (opht). The second class of specialists are in principle concerned with second or third line care, but often have a private o¢ ce outside the hospital. This class consists of psychiatrists (psych), ear, nose and throat-specialists (ENT ) and physiotherapists (phys).
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A third class of medical specialists is especially active in hospitals. Whereas internists (int) and surgeons (sur ) are also available for private consultations, there is no direct access to the remainder of the specialists.
We consider them as one group which we name the 'hospital specialists' (hos). Our focus lies on the …rst and second class of specialists.
A count of the Belgian physicians according to their type in the sampled municipalities is presented in the …rst column of Table 1 : e.g. we identify 608 dermatologists'and 1; 140 gynecologists'o¢ ces in Belgium.
The average number of physicians per type on municipality level is given in the second column of the table.
There are on average 16 GPs active in the selected municipalities, whereas the average number of specialists is a lot lower at between 1 and 3 specialists of each type per market. 40 It is clear from the data that there is a strong positive correlation between the numbers of physicians of each type in a market. For example, the number of GPs has the highest correlation with the number of dermatologists, with a correlation coe¢ cient of 0:84 and the correlation between specialist types averages around 86%. The question at hand is whether this is due to demand or cost characteristics of municipalities or rather due to the strategic interaction between physician types.
<Insert Table 1 here>
Market characteristics
To control for demand and cost characteristics in the di¤erent municipalities, we add a dataset with market characteristics for which the descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2 . According to studies on health status and morbidity, the age, gender and ethnic composition together with the socioeconomic status of the service population are important indicators for the demand of GP care (Boerma 2003) . We have information from the National Institute of Statistics (NIS) on the number of inhabitants (S ) and the population density (dens). 41 The dataset moreover includes variables indicating the age composition of the local population. We opt to work with seven age groups; 'age0_4 'gives the percentage population under the age of 5, 'age5_14 ', 'age15_29 ', 'age30_44 ', 'age45_59 ' and 'age60_75 ' give the percentage population in the respective age groups and …nally 'age75+'gives the percentage elderly, de…ned as over the age of 75. Further market characteristics are the percentage female population (female), the mean income level measured in ten thousand euros (income), the unemployment rate (unempl ) and the percentage of foreign population (foreign). We additionally include a dummy variable for the Belgian region in which the market is located, to identify common pro…tability shocks (or value of the outside option) across municipalities in the same area.
We furthermore collected data for the presence and the size of hospitals and constructed a variable indicating the number of hospital beds (beds_hosp). This variable can indicate agglomeration e¤ects in physician payo¤s and controls for the presence of alternative care. A further correction for alternative supply of health care comes with the inclusion of the number of beds in retirement homes (beds_rest).
<Insert Table 2 here> 6 Estimation Results Table 3 present the results of the estimation of the empirical entry model in which we focus on the …rst class of specialists, whereas the estimated coe¢ cients for the speci…cation with class-2 specialists are given in Table 4 . The di¤erent columns of the tables give the estimated coe¢ cients for the di¤erent physician types of the simultaneous estimation.
<Insert Table 3 here> <Insert Table 4 here>
As a goodness-of-…t measure, we simulate the number of entrants of all types given the market characteristics: for 1; 000 random draws for the error terms (from a logistic distribution), we calculate the equilibrium number of entrants in each market. We are able to predict the number of entrants per market rather accurately as the observed number of entrants systematically lies well within the con…dence bounds of the simulated equilibrium number of entrants. Following Berry and Waldfogel (1999), we compute the correlation of the predicted and the actual number of entrants per type to construct a R 2 for the regression. For the model with the class-1 (class-2) specialists, our estimation results in a R 2 of 0:79 (0:76).
The choice behavior of patients
Consider the estimated coe¢ cients for the strategic interaction e¤ects in upper panel of Tables 3 and 4 . The results indicate that the e¤ect of the number of physicians of the own type is always negative. The higher the number of same-type rivals, the lower payo¤s of entering the market. This is both consistent with economic theory and required by the equilibrium model we put forward. For the e¤ect of the number of physicians of the other types, the results are mixed. First, the number of GPs in the market mostly positively a¤ects payo¤s of specialist types. This can be explained by the potential presence of agglomeration e¤ects or by a lower workload of referred contacts compared to self-referrals.
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Second, the strategic interaction e¤ects in GP payo¤s have varying signs. 43 GP payo¤s are positively a¤ected by the number of gynecologists, pediatricians, ENT-specialists and physiologists in the market. In other words, the bene…ts for GPs from the ability to refer outweigh the costs associated with the free access to these specialist types. This implies that patients that require the care of these specialist types thus mainly access secondary care through the GP (high referral e¤ect) or correctly self-refer (low competition e¤ect).
The number of dermatologists, ophthalmologists and psychiatrists however has a negative impact on GPs' probability of entry: the costs due to the competition for patients here outweigh the referral bene…ts. An important part of the patients that use these types of secondary care services thus wrongly self-refer (high competition e¤ect).
Although we limit the issue of correlation in the type-speci…c market shocks through simultaneous estimation, we test for the likelihood of an upward bias in our estimated strategic interaction e¤ects. That is, using the model estimates, we retrieve the (average) value of the error terms and calculate correlation coe¢ cients. We …nd that the correlation between GP and specialist shocks lies between 0:02 and 0:04 for all specialist types, except for pediatricians and physiologists. For these specialist types, we …nd values of 0:15 4 2 Remember though that there can be an upward bias in these strategic interaction e¤ects (possible positive correlation in the error terms). We therefore do not stress this …nding.
4 3 The signs of the strategic interaction e¤ects are robust for changing payo¤s speci…cations, although the e¤ect of pediatricians and psychiatrists is not always signi…cant. We have tested the robustness of the signs and signi…cances of the strategic interaction e¤ects by estimating the model using more, less and other groupings of explanatory variables (e.g. province dummies instead of one region dummy), using di¤erent groupings of specialists into classes, using a re…ned de…nition of the number of hospital beds (splitting according to the type of care, e.g. geriatric beds, pediatric beds) and using alternative de…nitions for the strategic interaction terms (adding presence of specialists in the GP payo¤ function). and 0:64 respectively. We thus should be cautious in interpreting the positive interaction e¤ects for these specialist types.
For Belgium, we can thus conclude that the use of gynecologists' and ENT-specialists' services can be considered as complementary to GP services, whereas the use of dermatologists', ophthalmologists'and psychiatrists'services are mainly substitutes to GP services. As the competition e¤ect dominates the referral e¤ect for this group of specialists, we …nd that a lot of patients must be wrongly self-referring for these types of specialist care.
Consider for completeness the estimation results of the e¤ects of market characteristics on the entry probabilities of the physician types in Tables 3 and 4 . Caution is to be advised in the interpretation of these results: our controls for market demand, costs and outside option are aggregate and exhibit a strong collinearity. Furthermore, by allowing for a lot of strategic interaction e¤ects in the GP equation, we loose a lot of the explanatory power of demographic characteristics. For GPs, we …nd that payo¤s of entering a market are positively a¤ected by population size: the bigger the potential market, the more pro…table and thus probable is entry of a GP. For specialist types, market size (population) and the presence and size of hospitals are important indicators for the pro…tability of any specialist: the higher the number of inhabitants and the higher the number of hospital beds, the higher the probability of observing more specialists of any type. Also the percentage of young adults (15 29 age group), the percentage females and the average income level tend to have a positive impact on the number of specialists of the di¤erent types. This indicates that young adults, females and higher income people use specialist care more frequently. On the other hand, the unemployment rate of the population negatively a¤ects most specialist types and specialist payo¤s are lower in the Flanders region. The latter can be explained by a higher value of the outside option for specialists in the Flanders region.
Implications for Gatekeeping
The …ndings on the nature of the strategic interaction e¤ects have further relevance for policy makers in the debate on the introduction of gatekeeping in Belgium (or the price di¤erence between referrals and selfreferrals for specialist contacts when these are su¢ cient to induce a comparable change in patient behavior).
As discussed in section 3, the presence of mandatory referral schemes would change the entire organization of health care provision. Ine¢ ciencies can result when patients are currently correctly self-referring, whereas the sustainability of specialists is threatened to extent to which patients are currently wrongly self-referring.
Both mechanisms have a negative impact on the cost-bene…t analysis of the introduction of mandatory referrals and are thus relevant to the policy debate. Although we are not able to quantity these e¤ects, we can contribute to the discussion on gatekeeping by indicating for which specialist types these problems are likely to occur. Although our discussion can be seen as an argument against the implementation of gatekeeping, it should be clear that we are not evaluating the desirability of introducing mandatory referral schemes in the Belgium health care system. We do at most a partial analysis of welfare e¤ects which is only intended to provide some supporting information on the functioning of the physician markets as they are regulated today.
First, we …nd that an important part of the gynecologists'and ENT-specialists'contacts are referrals or correct self-referrals. For those patients who already get referred to the specialist, nothing changes due to the introduction of mandatory referral schemes. But the system would entail an obligatory …rst visit to the GP for those patients who correctly self-refer. This GP contact is unnecessary and thus ine¢ cient. Furthermore, other e¢ ciency bene…ts will not materialize as the number of specialist visits will not be reduced. In sum, introducing mandatory referrals in the gynecologists' and ENT-specialists' care is not likely to result in e¢ ciency gains as the majority of the patients naturally exhibit the desired behavior. Note though that even when all patients would correctly self-refer to these specialist types, the society might bene…t from having one GP centralizing all medical information on the patients. Second, the estimation results indicate that the activities of dermatologists, ophthalmologists and psychiatrists negatively impact GP payo¤s. This implies that these specialists realize a substantial part of their business (income) from patients that wrongly self-refer. The introduction of mandatory referral schemes for these types of medical care can thus result in important e¢ ciency gains.
At the same time though, the market opportunities of specialist types change when mandatory referral schemes trigger substantial drops in the demand for their services. This is most likely the case for specialist types that currently attract a lot of wrong self-referrals: the majority of the wrongly self-referred patients will not end up in their o¢ ce once mandatory referrals are in place (i.e. the GP will choose to threat these patients). Therefore, an important viability threat is expected for the active and future dermatologists, ophthalmologists and psychiatrists. Note that whereas dermatologists, ophthalmologists and psychiatrists are expected to experience the largest drop in market demand, the viability of the other specialist types will also be a¤ected by the introduction of mandatory referral schemes. That is, we identify only the net e¤ect of the presence of specialist types on GP payo¤s. Therefore, the …nding of a positive e¤ect only implies that the referral e¤ect dominates the competition e¤ect. It can thus be the case that the competition e¤ect is very big, but that the referral e¤ect is slightly more important. As a result, a substantial impact of the introduction of gatekeeping is to be expected as well. We thus identify the lower bound of the e¤ect.
To quantify the viability threat due to the introduction of gatekeeping, we simulate changes in the equilibrium market structure due to a drop in demand in the specialists' markets. Under the assumption that variable pro…ts are proportional to the market size (i.e. inhabitants with the same characteristics visit physicians the same number of times), this policy experiment is analogous to studying the impact of a decrease in the total number of inhabitants of the market. Therefore, the drop in demand is modeled as a percentage decrease in the number of inhabitants in the market ( ), with the market composition remaining constant (through lnS, see Schaumans and Verboven 2008) . Given their equilibrium entry behavior (as estimated), we consider the total number of specialist entrants of all types under four alternative situations:
we compare the status-quo entry behavior (under the current demand conditions: = 1) to the entry patterns following a percentage decrease in market population with factors = 0:75, 0:5 and 0:25. 44 The simulation results in Table 5 give the average equilibrium number of entrants in each market given changes in the total number of inhabitants in the market ( S) for 1; 000 random draws for the error terms (from a logistic distribution). We …nd for example that, whereas the current demand conditions allow for the presence of 677 (865) dermatologists (gynecologists) to operate pro…tably, a drop in demand by 25% ( = 0:75) reduces the total number of entrants to 508 (652). When demand halves, 336 (428) dermatologists (gynecologists) can be sustained, whereas a further reduction in demand to only a quarter of the original demand level ( = 0:25) results in a total number of 126 (202) dermatologist (gynecologist) entrants. Class-2 specialists seem to be less sensitive to demand drops.
Depending on how substantial the drop in demand for the specialists will be, considerable transition costs will realize: a lot of specialists will no longer be pro…table in the market and will have to exit. As dermatologists, ophthalmologists and psychiatrists are currently competing for patients with GPs, the drop in the demand for their services is expected to be the largest. For gynecologists and ENT-specialists (and for pediatricians and physiologists), the drop in demand will be more moderate. Assuming a 25% decrease in demand for the latter group of specialists and a 50% drop for the specialist types whose entry decisions are strategic substitutes for GPs'entry decisions, we …nd that a total of 1; 491 medical specialists will experience viability problems in case the Belgian policy makers continue the introduction of elements of gatekeeping into the care system. Note that this amounts to 25:8% of the total body of currently active specialists of class 1 and class 2, which are all high-skilled workers with very speci…c and expensive training.
Conclusion
This article studies whether general practitioners (GPs) bene…t from the presence of a specialist due to the option of referral or whether their interaction is rather dominated by the competition for patients. The entry literature lends itself nicely for studying these health care markets, as data availability is often an issue. However, whereas the entry literature traditionally focused on questions of product di¤erentiation, this article demonstrates the use of entry models to tackle a di¤erent type of research question. That is, we study the precise nature of the strategic interactions between di¤erent types of physicians. Although the entry literature has boomed in the last years, not much attention has been given to this problem. Because of the tradition of studying problems of product di¤erentiation, the assumption of types being strategic substitutes in the entry decision is ubiquitous. Often the strategic interactions between …rms are however not this simple: even though the competition e¤ect is most obvious, at least some positive e¤ect from the presence of other-type …rms is likely (think of e.g. agglomeration e¤ects, Vitorino 2008 , Dutta et al 2007 . When modeling the strategic interactions between …rm types, it is therefore advisable to allow for the possibility that a positive e¤ect is present and may be dominating the negative e¤ect. Modeling and estimating …rm conduct while allowing for these more ‡exible interactions requires the researcher to abandon either the pure-strategy equilibrium assumption or the assumption of complete information. We apply the latter strategy in this article.
We put forward a sequential incomplete information entry game that has the ‡exibility to identify the sign of the strategic interaction e¤ects between di¤erent types of …rms. The model is designed to avoid restrictions on the underlying payo¤s with respect to the e¤ect of other-type …rms and to avoid issues of non-existence of pure-strategy equilibria in case the strategic interaction e¤ects are asymmetric in sign. At the same time, the model remains computationally tractable and allows for su¢ cient …rm heterogeneity.
We use this game to study the strategic interactions in the Belgian physician markets, in which there is no gatekeeping role for GPs.
For the Belgian physician markets, the results indicate that we can group specialists into two categories.
First, the decisions of certain specialist types are strategic complements to the entry decision of GPs. This category includes gynecologists and ear, nose and throat-specialists (ENT). As GP payo¤s are increasing in the number of specialists of these types, we …nd that the competition e¤ect (patients instead go to the specialist) is dominated by the referral e¤ect (GPs'average cost of treatment drops). The majority of the patients is thus either referred to these specialist types or correctly self-refer. A second group of specialists consists of dermatologists, ophthalmologists and psychiatrists, whose entry decisions are found to be strategic substitutes in the entry decision of GPs. These specialist types mainly compete for patients with GPs. We therefore …nd that self-referred contacts make up a signi…cant part of the income of these specialists and often concern health issues that do not require specialist care (wrong self-referrals). Our results are not conclusive for pediatric and physiologic care. We conclude that there is ine¢ cient use of specialist care mostly for dermatologic, ophthalmologic and psychiatric care. 45 This induces unnecessary costs on society, both because of the higher unit cost of the treatment and because of the high(er) cost in training these specialists.
Recent developments in Western-Europe indicate that the introduction of mandatory referral schemes is strongly being considered. France introduced a system of non-compulsory coordinated care pathways for patients in January 2005, which includes the reduction of patients'freedom of choice through …nancial incentives (HealthPolicyMonitor). Also Belgium and Germany recently introduced price di¤erences between referred specialist contacts and self-referrals.
46
Our …ndings on the choice behavior of patients are furthermore instructive for this debate. First, our analysis shows that some e¢ ciency gains and cost savings can be realized by introducing mandatory referral schemes. As we …nd that an important part of the use of dermatologic, ophthalmological and psychiatric services is unnecessary (ine¢ cient), direct bene…ts would realize from a drop in the use of this expensive specialized care. Our results therefore indicate that the price increase for self-referred specialist contacts, as recently been introduced in the Belgian health care system (and provided that the incentives are strong enough) will yield cost savings and e¢ ciency gains from the reduced use of dermatologic, ophthalmological and psychiatric care. However, this strategy seems not appropriate for the other specialist types: as the majority of the population correctly self-refers to these specialist types or already gets referred by the GP, the incentives to visit the GP especially results in additional transaction costs, i.e. unnecessary GP contacts. The strategy by the French government to limit the price increases for self-referrals to a particular group of specialists is therefore more appropriate: for Belgium, our results suggest that e¢ ciency gains can be realized from setting substantial price di¤erences between referrals and self-referrals for dermatologists, ophthalmologists and psychiatrists.
47
Second, the same results are informative for the transition costs of implementing gatekeeping associ-4 5 Unfortunately, we cannot …nd any corroborating evidence for our …ndings as no quantitative or qualitative analysis on the number of wrong self-referrals per specialist type is available.
4 6 European countries are public insurance countries such that the policy is national wide. This is contrary to the US case where the organization of health provision depends on the insurance contract you buy. About 70% of the insured Americans are enrolled in some form of managed care plan (Glied 2000) , where several of the HMOs practice gatekeeping. The dynamics in the US are furthermore di¤erent. Recently, some HMOs have relaxed the restrictions on access to specialists (Ferris et al 2001) . We also see this tendency in Sweden.ated to the viability of the body of specialists. As the mandatory referral scheme excludes the possibility for patients to self-refer to a specialist, our …ndings suggest that mainly dermatologists, ophthalmologists and psychiatrists will experience viability problems following the introduction of gatekeeping. Given these …ndings, policy makers might decide to further restrict the number of students specializing in the …eld of dermatology, ophthalmology and psychiatry, anticipating on the lower demand for these services in case they pursue the introduction of mandatory referral schemes.
The viability threats for the body of specialists are especially problematic when gatekeeping is gradually introduced as in Belgium and neighboring countries. That is, in case a mandatory referral scheme is implemented without the accompanying capitation system, the income level of specialists is directly a¤ected.
Furthermore, as a result specialists have incentives to (start to) induce more demand for their services as to maintain their income level. The anticipated bene…ts in terms of cost containment would then not materialize. In case the mandatory referral scheme is combined with a capitation system, comparable problems emerge. To ensure viability, the …xed fee per patient enrolled with a specialist will have to be set high, both in absolute terms and compared to the capitation for the GP, as the number of patients per specialist will be relatively low. From a budget perspective, this will not be maintainable. In case the regulator sets more realistic …xed fees for specialists, a proportion of the health professionals will experience viability problems and the transition costs will materialize. Note that only when GPs do not get the correct incentives, i.e. in case GPs minimize their e¤ort level and always refer patients to specialists, the current body of specialists can be sustained.
Finally, we want to stress that our conclusions are hard to generalize to other countries. All results crucially depend on the habits of the patients and the behavior of the professionals, which are the result of all incentives in the health system but also of culture. It would therefore be interesting to repeat our exercise for other countries in search of more general patterns. The care system in France before the 2005 reform is most comparable to the Belgian care organization (although the consumption of medical care is very di¤erent). The application of our methodology could shed light on the appropriateness of the French policy choice of the di¤erential introduction of mandatory referrals. The United States is also an interesting case as both gatekeeping and free choice exist next to each other as a result of their private insurance system.
To the extent that physicians can be attributed to be active in one of the systems (e.g. is he/she an HMO physician), a comparison of the size of the specialized workforce and workload could be instructive for the di¤erences in demand for specialist care between a gatekeeping system and a non-gatekeeping system. 
